

VZCZCXYZ0220
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHEG #0796/01 1081509
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171509Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8964
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 000796

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NEA/ELA FOR IRWIN
OSD FOR AGUIRRE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2018
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PASS](#) [MARR](#) [EG](#)
SUBJECT: COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT OF THE TRANSFER OF (112)
AN/PVS-7B NIGHT VISION GOGGLES AND (30) SPARE IMAGE
INTENSIFIER TUBES

REF: A. EGYPTIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE LETTER OF REQUEST
07/OV/185 FOR THIRTY (30) SPARE IMAGE
INTENSIFIER TUBES
[1](#)B. EGYPTIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE LETTER OF REQUEST
07/OV/201 FOR ONE HUNDRED TWELVE (112)
AN/PVS-7B NIGHT VISION GOGGLES (NVGS)

Classified By: DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (D).

[1](#)1. (C) Description: In Ref A and B, the GOE requests 112 AN/PVS-7B NVG and 30 Spare Image Intensifier Tubes to support Border Guard Force operations. The spare Image Intensifier Tubes will allow the Ministry of Defense to maintain NVGs in their inventory.

[1](#)2. (C) Reason the purchaser desires NVGs: The Egyptian Border Guards require the AN/PVS-7B NVGs to operate effectively at night along their international borders. The NVGs would improve the capability to operate with U.S. Forces in a coalition environment as the AN/PVS-7B is easily sustainable through the U.S. supply system.

[1](#)3. (C) How the NVGs would affect Egypt's force structure: These NVGs will increase the Border Guard capability to conduct night operations along its international borders. There will be no increase in force structure; however there will be an increase in Border Guard capability to operate effectively at night.

[1](#)4. (S) How the NVGs would contribute to both U.S. and Egyptian defense/security goals: NVG sales are consistent with DOD's Security Cooperation Guidance as it enhances the territorial security of regional states. It supports two of CENTCOM's Security Cooperation objectives for Egypt:

- a. Enabling allies and partners
- b. Protecting U.S. and partner interest.

This purchase would also support two of CENTCOM's Security Cooperation Desired Effects (SCDE) for Egypt:

-- SCDE 3.2 "Support the defense modernization and transformation of allies or partners to reduce their vulnerability external aggression and coercion"

-- SCDE 4.2 "Improve their capability to operate independently or in coalition with U.S. Forces"

[1](#)5. (C) Justification for the type and quantity of NVGs requested: 112x AN/PVS-7B are consistent with the quantity of NVGs required within a U.S. Battalion. The current Border

Guard force has a current operational strength of approximately 10,000 personnel. The amount requested provides some additional night-fighting capability to that force. The spare intensifier tubes are necessary to sustain that capability. The 30 spare tubes provide a less than 5% spare part capability for all AN/PVS-7B NVGs in the current Egyptian inventory.

¶16. (C) Combatant Commander's concurrence to the introduction of a new war-fighting capability to the nation or region: The procurement of these goggles and spare tubes does not represent a new war-fighting capability to Egypt. However, the Combatant Commander's concurrence will be provided separately.

¶17. (C) Anticipated reactions of the neighboring nations: Release of NVGs should not impact the regional balance of power or cause negative reactions from any of Egypt's neighbors. This sale does not introduce new technology to Egypt or the region and will not impact Israel's qualitative military edge.

¶18. (C) Assessment of the nation's ability to account for, safeguard, operate, maintain, and support the articles: The Egyptians have demonstrated the intent and ability to protect sensitive, classified military technology over an extended period. Egypt signed a General Security of Information Agreement with the U.S. and, as a customer, has purchased and protected the sensitive technology of other U.S. weapons systems. Egypt has procured night vision technology in the past to include AN/PVS-7Bs and has met all previous security and monitoring requirements.

¶19. (C) Training required either in-country or in the U.S. and anticipated reactions resulting from the presence of U.S.

trainers in-country: No additional training would be required for the sale of these NVGs. There is no additional presence that would be required beyond normal U.S. interaction with the Border Guard personnel.

¶110. (C) Source of financing and the economic impact of the proposed acquisition: Egypt plans to procure NVDs utilizing Foreign Military Financing and has already allocated sufficient funds within their FY08/09 funding priority listing to finance a potential NVG purchase.

¶111. (C) Human rights considerations relevant to the proposed acquisition: The Egyptian military has no history of human rights abuses and is under civilian control. There are no human rights considerations that would preclude the release of ammunition to the Egyptian military.

¶112. (C) Plan for end-use monitoring and plan for compliance verification: The Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) Egypt has a robust Golden Sentry Program. The Golden Sentry point of contact, working in close coordination with the security assistance program officer, will review and maintain copies of the purchaser's physical security and accountability control plan, maintain a serial number list of all NVGs and intensifier tubes that may be offered or transferred, and stands ready to assist with or conduct inventories and inspections as required. The Egyptian military currently has over 2500 Night Vision Devices of various configurations in-country and has maintained accountability and security of those devices without unauthorized loss, theft, or access to date.

¶113. (C) Operational Plan and specific end-users: The operational plan for the NVGs states that the Border Guard forces will use the NVGs in current operations along the Gaza-Egypt border. The extent of anti-terrorism missions may include countering intrusions of terrorists through the Gaza Strip-Egypt Border Area. The GOE has indicated a willingness to meet U.S. guidelines for accountability and security of NVGs, and the Office of Military Cooperation will conduct End-Use Monitoring (EUM) of the devices if the transfer is

approved.

¶14. (C) Recommendation: The Country Team recommends USG approval for transfer of the NVGs and the Spare Intensifier Tubes. This is a coordinated mission position.
RICCIARDONE